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Random numbers are an essential resource to many applications, including cryptography and
Monte Carlo simulations. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) represent the ultimate
source of randomness, as the numbers are obtained by sampling a physical quantum process that
is intrinsically probabilistic. However, they are yet to be widely employed to replace deterministic
pseudo random number generators (PRNG) for practical applications. QRNGs are regarded as
interesting devices. However they are slower than PRNGs for simulations and are typically seen
as clumsy laboratory prototypes, prone to failures and unreliable for cryptographic applications.
Here we overcome these limitations and demonstrate a compact and self-contained QRNG capable
of generating random numbers at a pace of 8 Gbit/s uninterruptedly for 71 days. During this
period, the physical parameters of the quantum process were monitored in real time by self-checking
functions implemented in the generator itself. At the same time, the output random numbers were
analyzed with the most stringent suites of statistical tests. The analysis shows that the QRNG under
test sustained the continuous operation without physical instabilities or hardware failures. At the
same time, the output random numbers were analyzed with the most stringent suites of statistical
tests, which were passed during the whole operation time. This extensive trial demonstrates the
reliability of a robustly designed QRNG and paves the way to its use in practical applications based
on randomness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are essential in many fields of sci-
ence and information technology. The two main ways to
generate them are either by iterating deterministic algo-
rithm, the so-called pseudo random number generators
(PRNG), or by sampling a natural physical process, the
so-called true random number generators (TRNG). Al-
though natural randomness has been acknowledged as
the ideal method to generate random numbers for simu-
lations or cryptographic keys [1, 2], PRNGs are normally
preferred for these tasks [3, 4]. Simulation-wise, the typ-
ical motivation is that TRNGs do not allow for results
reproducibility. Cryptography-wise, TRNGs are believed
to silently drift or break over time, thus compromising
security.
On the other hand, PRNGs are intrinsically pre-
dictable and this can be exploited to break cryptographic
security [5–7]. Moreover, in Monte Carlo methods, the
presence of artefacts or patterns in the strings generated
by a PRNG can produce unreliable simulation results
[8]. Finally, reproducibility can be easily achieved with
a TRNG by recording the output number stream and
reusing it. It is reasonable to expect that such an ap-
proach will become increasingly viable as TRNGs’ gen-
eration rates increases [9, 10].
Motivated by this premise, we present in this work a
TRNG that exploits the intrinsic randomness of a quan-
tum optical process [11, 12] to meet both the reliabil-
ity and the high generation rate demanded by applica-
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tions. We demonstrate the stable and continuous gen-
eration of random numbers from this quantum random
number generator (QRNG) at 8 Gbit/s rate. The out-
putted strings pass an extensive application of statistical
randomness tests after a weak post-processing.
With the exception of few recent works, e.g. [13–
15], ultrafast generation rates from a QRNG are typi-
cally achieved during proof of principle demonstrations.
Lab equipment is used to generate the random signals,
which are acquired by fast digital oscilloscopes [16–19].
Then, analysis and post-processing of the recorded data
are done “offline”, but the reported generation rates are
evaluated as if all these processes were performed “on the
fly”. In addition, the statistical tests to assess the qual-
ity of the numbers are applied just few times, typically
once, on a limited data sample, mostly because of the
oscilloscope finite storing capacity. Drawing a conclusion
from this small statistics requires the additional strong
assumption that the analyzed sample is representative of
the entire stream the generator would normally output.
In this work, we present a self-contained small QRNG
that performs live analysis and live post-processing of
the random signals. The device is capable of stable op-
eration and is self-checking. The latter feature means
that QRNG monitors some parameters of its main in-
ternal components, to check whether they are operating
properly. As a proof, we present the results of an unin-
terrupted test of a QRNG lasted 71 days. The QRNG’s
ultrafast generation rate allowed us to rapidly collect suf-
ficient data to repeatedly apply the most stringent bat-
teries of statistical tests several times.
In the following, we will review the QRNG’s main fea-
tures and present the results of the long term test.
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FIG. 1. The QRNG self-contained unit. The compact enclo-
sure’s size is 10× 23× 5cm3.
II. THE GENERATOR
The QRNG described in this work is based on the same
working principle as the one presented in [21]. However,
rather than performing a proof-of-principle experiment,
we integrated all the optical and electronic components
into a stand-alone self-contained device, depicted in Fig-
ure 1.
The physical mechanism exploited to generate random
numbers is the spontaneous emission from a pulsed laser
[21]. The physical core of the generator comprises a 1550
nm laser that emits steady state pulses with a repetition
rate of 1 GHz. The use of this wavelength was moti-
vated by the wide availability of high bandwidth lasers
and photodiodes at telecom wavelengths. Therefore, the
generator realization is eased since it can be built by em-
ploying standard commercial optical components. The
pulses are emitted by a distributed feedback (DFB) laser
diode in a standard 14-pin butterfly package integrat-
ing a photodiode for power monitoring, and a thermistor
together with a thermoelectric cooling (TEC) for tem-
perature regulation.
The delay of 1 ns between two consecutive pulses is suf-
ficient to empty the laser cavity between two successive
emissions. Therefore, each newly stimulated emission is
triggered by a spontaneously emitted photon that car-
ries the phase of the vacuum field, which is completely
random over the interval [0, 2pi].
This phase is then measured by interfering pairs of op-
tical pulses in a one-bit-delayed fibre-based interferom-
eter, whose optical output is sent to photodiode (PD).
The PD is a commercial InGaAs/InP PIN receiver for
classical optical communication, featuring a bandwidth
of 5 GHz. The PD converts the random intensity optical
input into a randomly varying current that is sampled by
an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) with 10-bit resolu-
tion. These samples are therefore unpredictable by virtue
of the physical uncertainty associated with the vacuum
state.
This quantum uncertainty prevents a malevolent ad-
versary to predict when a given number will be emit-
ted. However, the adversary can still take advantage of
the arcsine probability distribution of the interferometer
output, and bet on the appearance of the most likely
intensity values, which are the ones at the extremes of
the distribution. It is therefore necessary to manipu-
late the numbers with a post-processing technique to
remove this impairment. We use a finite impulse re-
sponse (FIR) filter to unbias the numbers and to achieve
a flat distribution of the 8-bit integers [21, 22]. This
technique consists in transforming a raw integer sample
x(n) into an unbiased one y(n), by means of the relation
y(n) = b0x(n) + b1x(n− 1) + · · ·+ bMx(n−M) mod 28,
with binomial coefficients bi = M !/(i!(M − i)!). After
the FIR processing, the QRNG outputs a stable stream
of unbiased numbers at 1 GB/s.
It is worth clarifying that the FIR filter is not equiva-
lent to a randomness extractor, which distills the entropy
of the output string by compressing it [23]. The filter
does not perform compressing, but simply scrambles the
raw samples by dispersing each input x into M + 1 out-
puts y as a pragmatic unbiasing algorithm. Hence, the
filtered output has exactly same entropy per bit as its
raw input. We stress that the actual entropy in the FIR
filtered output needs to be considered when used in sen-
sitive cryptographic applications.
On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that for
applications where security is not a concern and gener-
ation speed is required, e.g. Monte Carlo methods, the
FIR filter remains extremely effective. This holds when
the initial amount of entropy in the generated strings is
high, like in our case with average raw entropy of 0.9 bits.
This is shown in Sec. V, where a large number of strict
statistical tests are passed without applying temporal re-
strictions on the generated strings.
The compactness of the QRNG is achieved by embed-
ding optical and electronic components into a printed
circuit board (PCB). The functions of driving and mon-
itoring the devices and of processing and outputting the
signals are performed by an FPGA, which constitutes the
electronic and digital backbone of the generator.
The versatility of the FPGA allows us to program dif-
ferent functions for the live monitoring of the physical pa-
rameters. This sort of sanity check is essential to discover
instabilities or malfunctions that might affect the output
randomness. In Figure 2, a logic scheme of the QRNG is
reported with the main check functions reported.
The main physical active component is the laser. The
laser output power determines the maximal range of the
interference signal and hence the range of the current sig-
nal sampled by the ADC. This has to be finely tuned such
that the interference signal can span all the available dy-
namical range without exceeding the upper digitization
limit. To control power fluctuations due to the varia-
tion of laser temperature, we provided the laser with a
temperature controller and implemented a function that
monitors both the laser output power and the laser tem-
Accepted in IEEE/OSA Journal of Lightwave Technology 2 DOI 10.1109/JLT.2018.2841773
FIG. 2. Top: Logic blocks of the QRNG. The bottom row
represents the part of the device directly involved in the gen-
eration of the random numbers. The top row represents the
digital functions that were implemented to monitor the sys-
tem operation. Bottom: The foreground histogram (green)
represents the interference intensity values measured by the
PD and digitized by the ADC. The data are distributed ac-
cording the expected arcsine distribution. The background
histogram (red) represents the noise signal acquired between
two pulses. Both these histogram are continuously acquired
by the check functions implemented in the generator board.
perature. This way, the user can be aware of the laser
status and can abort the generation in case of a sudden
drift from the optimal operating condition.
The QRNG samples the PD output signal with a rate
of 2 GS/s so that every 1 ns two data samples are gen-
erated. The first sample collects the optical interfering
signal, the so-called foreground data, as depicted in the
foreground (green) histogram in Figure 2 bottom. The
second sample collects the non-optical signal between two
interference pulses, i.e., the noise level of the PD (back-
ground data), as depicted in the background (red) his-
togram in Figure 2 bottom. The QRNG is programmed
to continuously collect and histogram foreground and
background data. This function is important for two rea-
sons. On one hand, it allows the user to check whether
the foreground distribution follows the theoretical inten-
sity distribution pertaining to the interference process.
On the other hand, it enables the monitoring of the back-
ground data, which is useful to detect a malfunction of
the laser driving system. In particular, this makes it
possible to detect light pulses emitted during the laser’s
off time, which could hinder the phase randomization of
consecutive pulses.
In parallel to the histogram of the above physical dis-
tributions, the QRNG computes also the distribution of
the data after the FIR, to enable a comparison against
the uniform distribution expected from unbiased num-
bers.
A standard USB communication protocol lets the user
set the operational parameters of the device and read the
Parameter Value Unit
Laser Power 5.03 ± 0.01 mW
TABLE I. Laser output power (mW) monitored by the health
check functions of the QRNG.
FIG. 3. Daily average values of the laser powers logged by
the power monitoring function.
data produced by the monitor functions. High speed data
interfaces, such as 10G and SATA, are also provisioned
for outputting 8 Gb/s stream of random numbers. In this
study, the SATA interface is used to feed the random bit
stream to a PC for statistical randomness tests.
III. TESTING STRATEGY
To assess the QRNG suitability to cryptographic ap-
plications, we studied its response over a long period of
time. In particular we focused on the two following prop-
erties:
1) Operational stability : the operational parameters
of the components, such as the output power of the laser
or its temperature, are required to not deviate from the
optimal values that maximize the output entropy. For
example, a too low laser power would not match the dy-
namic range of the ADC, whereas a too high power would
saturate the PD.
2) Randomness stability : the generation of unbiased
numbers has to be guaranteed for a prolonged and un-
interrupted use of the device. Although the operational
parameters might stay stable and without drifts, possi-
ble errors in the hardware and software implementation
and/or failures of the unmonitored components, could
introduce bias, correlation or artifacts in the outputted
numbers.
We ran the device for 71 days without interruption.
To check the operational stability (point (1)), we moni-
tored and recorded the system’s operational parameters
through the functions presented in Section II.A. To test
the randomness stability (point (2)), we applied statisti-
cal tests in series and recorded the test results.
The advantage of data logging is that it makes it possi-
ble to perform an accurate a-posteriori analysis. In par-
ticular, possible failures of the statistical tests can be
compared against the values the physical parameters at
the time of failure. Concerning this last point, it is well
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Parameter Value Unit
Shannon Entropy 9.27 ± 0.02 bits
Min-Entropy 8.56 ± 0.04 bits
TABLE II. Shannon entropy and min-entropy values calcu-
lated from the foreground monitor function.
FIG. 4. Shannon entropy (blue solid line) and min-entropy
(red line) of the QRNG, as evaluated from the foreground
data.
understood that statistical tests on the outputted post-
processed data cannot certify the unpredictability of the
numbers, as this is meant to be achieved with a theoret-
ical model of the quantum process employed. However,
they can detect some deviations from the optimal oper-
ating conditions and possible hardware failures. In this
sense, the foreground-background monitoring function is
useful to enable the comparison of the experimental data
against the theoretical model of the generator.
IV. PHYSICAL TESTING
During the whole testing period, the data of the mon-
itor functions were recorded. In Table I, we report the
mean values and the standard deviations of laser power.
This parameter was read by the monitor function from
the photodiode embedded into the laser. In Figure 3, we
draw its average on intervals of 24 hours.
From this result, it appears that the system is charac-
terized by a stable performance. The laser power features
average relative fluctuations of 0.2%, with a maximal reg-
istered deviation of +2.1% from the mean value.
Such stability was obtained by means of a temperature
controller that kept the laser temperature stable during
the test. Readouts from the controller monitor function
registered a temperature standard deviation of 0.33 C.
As we already mentioned, it is important that the gen-
erator keeps a stable laser power, to obtain a sample
distribution that spans the whole ADC range without
saturating the PD.
The data of the foreground function correspond to
the frequency of the digitized interference intensity, X,
which falls in the interval [0, 1023]. The histograms pro-
vide the occurrence probabilities p(X) of the events from
which the Shannon entropy and the min-entropy are eval-
uated in real time. These two quantities are, respectively,
equivalent to the average and minimal amount of unbi-
ased bits that can be extracted from the raw samples
X. As mentioned before, the distribution of the X val-
ues is not uniform and therefore the entropies are always
smaller than the ten bits featured by the ADC.
The benefit of having a temperature-controlled laser
with a stable output power is that it creates stable ex-
perimental conditions to keep the amount of generated
randomness almost constant. This is evident from the
data registered for the entropies.
In Table II, we report the entropies mean values and
standard deviations for the whole testing period. In Fig-
ure 4, the blue and red lines correspond to the daily
average of Shannon entropy and min-entropy respec-
tively. We notice that both the entropies feature very
limited fluctuations, 0.2% and 0.45% for Shannon and
min-entropy, respectively, with a maximal registered vari-
ation of +0.42% and +2.43%, respectively. Hence the
QRNG always approaches the highest entropy values al-
lowed by the physics of the process. The high entropy
content of the raw samples X made it possible an effec-
tive application of the FIR unbiasing filter, as it will be
demonstrated by the test results in the next two sections.
V. STATISTICAL TESTS
The task of performing the statistical tests of a ran-
dom number generator is well studied and a multitude of
solutions are available. Well-known batteries commonly
applied such as “FIPS-140-2” [24] or “Die Hard” [25] are
inadequate for our intended analysis, as they are either
too weak or too limited in the number of tests. A valid
alternative, featuring more stringent tests and an exten-
sive number of batteries, is represented by the Test-U01
and the NIST SP-800-22, which are those we have used
to test the QRNG.
A. Test-U01
The TestU01 suite [26] is acknowledged to be the most
stringent collection of tests to assess RNG statistical
properties. These tests can be applied singularly or as
batteries. For the long term test, we applied the largest
battery denominated “Big Crush”. This battery features
106 tests selected to cover the widest spectrum of possible
problems. A single run of Big Crush analyzes a dataset
of approximately 1.143×1013 bits and takes typically 4.5
hours. The ultrafast generation rate of our QRNG en-
ables the generation of this amount of numbers in just 24
minutes. Since this rate exceeds the hard drive writing
speed, the datasets were obtained by attaching blocks
of numbers with a size of 80 Gb. Each block was ac-
quired in real time, as it was directly written into the
volatile memory of the computer, and then moved to a
solid state disk to build the dataset. This bottleneck in-
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FIG. 5. Number of p-values outside the confidence interval
in sets containing the results of four consecutive Big Crush
battery, which is the typical amount of times the battery was
applied per day. The green line represents the daily mean
value of nout. The dashed red line corresponds to the daily
acceptance range.
creased the acquisition time to 73 minutes. However, it
was still small enough to apply the battery multiple times
per day, achieving an unprecedented assurance level for
the testing process.
It is worth stressing that the multiple application of
a test is fundamental not only to track the generator
response, but also to rule out possible “lucky” or “un-
lucky” results that could occur with a single shot appli-
cation. When a test is applied to a string, one or more
p-values are evaluated: if the result is inside the interval
IBC = [0.001, 0.999] the test is considered passed. Dur-
ing the testing period the battery was applied 285 times,
corresponding to a total of 3.258 Petabit analyzed. The
overall number of p-values obtained was 72,390.
To understand how the QRNG performed during the
testing period, we studied whether the number nout of
p-values outside IBC was in line with the statistical fluc-
tuations for a sample of that size. Since the probability of
failure is α = 0.002, we expect nout = α× 72, 390 ' 145.
In addition, we follow [28], to estimate an acceptance
range for nout: by means of the Gaussian approximation
to the binomial distribution, we evaluate an acceptance
range of 109 ≤ nout ≤ 181. From the analysis of the test
results, we found nout = 151, which is fully compatible
with the expectations.
Although the number of suspicious p-values was in line
with the expectations, it is necessary to assess the possi-
ble presence of a “catastrophic failure” among the failed
tests. For catastrophic failure is intended a p-value very
close to 0 or to 1, e.g. 10−10, whose occurrence cannot
be justified in terms of the statistical fluctuations linked
to the size of the set of p-values. We verified that no p-
value occurred outside the interval [10−6, 1− 10−6]. For
the interval [10−5, 1−10−5], we obtained nout = 2, which
is well within the acceptance range 0 ≤ nout ≤ 5.
The above analysis has assessed that the total num-
ber of p-values outside the confidence interval is in line
with what is predicted by the theory. However, to check
the stationarity of the device, it is relevant to study how
these extreme p-values were distributed in time. In par-
ticular, we wanted to verify whether clustered failures
FIG. 6. Number of uniformity p-values outside the confidence
interval in sets containing the results of forty consecutive ap-
plications SP-800-22 suite. The dashed red line corresponds
to the daily acceptance range.
were present. In fact, a concentration of very high nout
values, in a limited amount of time, would clearly indi-
cate the presence of a physical hardware problem.
In Figure 5, we plot the nout value after regrouping
the p-values in subsets. Each subset contains 1,016 p-
values, corresponding to four consecutive runs of the bat-
tery. This is indeed the typical number of times the
battery was applied per day. The evaluated average of
nout = 2.11 (green solid line in the plot) is in line with the
expected value of nout ' 2 (0.002× 1, 016). Although we
obtained nout = 7 at subset 59, which is slightly above
the threshold of 6 (red dashed line in the plot) we did
not consider this fact as suspicious, since the p-values
outside the limits belonged each time to different tests.
In addition, by cross-checking this result with both the
monitor parameters (Figure 3 and 4) and with the results
from another test suite (Figure 6), we did not observe any
particularly suspicious variation.
It is worth noticing that the values for nout were evenly
distributed during the whole testing period. This indi-
cates that no hardware failures or drifts with a notice-
able impact on the output randomness occurred during
the whole testing period.
B. NIST SP-800-22
Although the TEST-U01 represents the state of the art
in statistical randomness testing, we analyzed the num-
bers also with the test suite SP 800-22 developed by the
NIST [27, 28]. This suite is commonly used for QRNGs
and this would ease a comparison between our results
and previous works.
During the testing period, the battery was applied
2,849 times. For each run we used a 1 Gbit input string
and we applied 15 tests. Differently from Big Crush,
where each test analyzes different and very long subsam-
ples of the input string, the NIST tests are all applied on
the same string. In particular, any new input string is
divided into L = 1, 000 substrings, each 106 bits long, so
that each test is applied L times. For the NIST suite the
significance level is α = 0.01.
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FIG. 7. Each column represents the weekly average passing ratio for each test. The passing ratio corresponds to the fraction
of 1 Mbit long sub-strings featuring a p-value ≥ 0.01. For a sample of L = 1,000 bits, the threshold to pass the test is 0.981
and it is represented by the white line on top of each bar plot. For the “Random Excursion” and “Random Excursion Variant”
tests, L ' 600 and the threshold is approximately 0.978.
If a test on a given substring yields a p-value ≥ 0.01,
the test is considered passed with confidence 99%. If the
numbers are statistically sound, the L p-values should
follow the uniform distribution. Hence, for each test,
the suite evaluates the sub-string passing ratio and per-
forms a goodness-of-fit (GOF) test on the observed p-
value distribution. This second order test is performed
by regrouping the L p-values in ten bins of width 0.1,
and by computing a χ2 test statistic. The test on the
whole input string is then considered passed if the pass-
ing ratio is approximately of 99%, and if the “uniformity”
p-value associated to the corresponding χ2 test statistic
is ≥ 10−4.
Each run yield 188 p-values, given that some tests fea-
ture many variants. The overall number of the unifor-
mity p-values generated during the 71 days amounts to
535,612. For this sample size, the number nout of p-
values < 10−4, is expected to be comprised in the inter-
val 32 ≤ nout ≤ 76 and centred on the value nout = 54.
We observed nout = 46 which is again fully compatible
with the theory.
Also for the NIST suite, we studied the temporal dis-
tribution of nout. Each day, the NIST suite was ap-
plied 40 times, yielding 7,520 p-values. In Figure 6, the
points represent the value of nout per day. The solid
green line corresponds to the daily average value of nout,
equal to 0.65, which is close to the expected value 0.75
(' 0.0001 × 7, 520). The red dashed line corresponds
to the threshold level, above which no points were reg-
istered. Hence, these results confirmed the conclusions
drawn for Big Crush.
As mentioned above, for each test the suite evaluates
also the fraction of 1 Mbit long substrings that yielded a
p-value larger than 0.01. The suite automatically applies
the Gaussian approximation to the binomial distribution.
The minimal success fraction to consider the test passed
on the whole set of L substrings is 98.1% (it is worth
to specify that for the so called “Random Excursion”
and “Random Excursion Variant” tests the sample size
is L ' 600, such that the typical threshold fraction is
about 97.8%).
To effectively present the results regarding the passing
ratio, we report in Figure 7 the weekly average for each
test (since tests “Non Overlapping Template”, “Random
Excursion”, “Random Excursion Variant” and “Serial”
feature different variants, for these tests we report the
average on all their variants). As one can appreciate from
the figure, the generator kept the averaging passing ratio
above the threshold for all tests. Although these results
were somehow anticipated from that already presented,
the figure is relevant since it confirms that also at the
scale of short strings, the generator does not fail to output
bits with high statistical qualities.
VI. CONCLUSION
We reported the results of an unprecedentedly long 71-
day non-stop trial of a QRNG. We showed its capability
to sustain uninterrupted operation while providing a con-
tinuous, laminar flow of unbiased numbers at 8 Gbit/s.
By analyzing the data recorded from the functions con-
tinuously monitoring the physical parameters, we showed
that the generator maintained a stationary behavior,
without drifting from the optimal experimental condi-
tions. This stability enabled a constant success rate for
the most stringent battery of statistical tests, the Big
Crush of Test-U01 suite. This is the first time that such
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an extensive test, with almost 300 applications of the Big
Crush battery, is reported. To our knowledge, the only
other reported example is with the QRNG developed by
PicoQuant to which the Big Crush test was applied a
total of 60 times [29, 30].
Once the generator is provided with a
cryptographically-strong randomness extractor, these re-
sults show the suitability of the QRNG in cryptographic
applications, including quantum key distribution (QKD),
for which it is essential to employ random numbers gen-
erated from strictly non-deterministic generators. In
fact, the ultrafast generation rate makes our QRNG
compatible with most of the current QKD systems,
which typically feature maximum clock rates around 1
GHz [31].
We believe that the demonstrated speed, robust de-
sign and stable operation of the quantum random num-
ber generator will promote it as a valid alternative to the
current solutions adopted to generate random numbers.
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